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Abstract 
 
The Five Buddha Districts system prevailed from the 1790s to the 1880s on the frontier between 
Yunnan, in Southwest China, and the Burmese Kingdom, in the mountainous areas to the west of 
the Mekong River. Through more than a century of political mobilization, the Lahu communities 
in this area became an integrated and militarized society, and their culture was reconstructed in 
the historical context of ethnic conflicts, competition, and cooperation among the Wa, Dai, and 
Han Chinese settlers. The political elites of the Five Buddha Districts, however, were monks 
who had escaped the strict orthodoxy of the Qing government to become local chieftains, or 
rebels, depending on political changes in southern Yunnan. As a centralized polity, the Five 
Buddha Districts system was attached to the frontier politics of the Qing state before the coming 
of European colonial powers. The Qing state provided a sociopolitical space for local groups to 
develop their political ideals between various powerful Dai-Shan chieftains. The negotiation, 
competition, and cooperation between the Five Buddha leadership and the Qing, Dai chieftains, 
and neighboring political powers had been thoroughly integrated into the frontier politics of this 
interdependent society for more than two hundred years. As the history of the Yunnan-Burma 
frontier formation shows that no mountain space existed to allow the natives to escape from the 
state through their shifting agriculture, and anarchism was not practiced by the mountain people 
who were separated from the state, the author argues that a stateless region like James Scott’s 
“Zomia” did not historically exist in this region. 
 
Keywords: Five Buddha Districts, Yunnan-Burma frontier, Lahu, ethnic creation, Zomia 
 
Introduction 
With the increase in Han immigration from interior provinces like Jiangxi, Hunan, Sichuan, and 
the various methods of controlling local resources such as tea, salt, and mines, the conditions for 
ethnic mobilization for native ethnic minorities in Yunnan’s southern frontier had been 
established since the early Qing dynasty (Ma 2013b). Due in particular to political reform aimed 
at integrating local Dai chieftains into the administrative county system after the 1720s, more 
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and more Han immigrants assimilated into local native communities. Some of these immigrants 
became religious and political leaders in these mountain communities, following a secret society 
tradition faithful to the Big Vehicle Religion (Da Cheng Jiao ???) (Ma 2011). Meanwhile, 
other Han people gradually settled into basins in places like Mianning and Yun Counties and 
developed the power of their gentry polity linked with various cities along the transportation 
routes between Yunnan and Burma (Ma forthcoming). This article argues that the ethnicity of the 
Lahu (??), or Luohei (??), people was created by the sociohistorical consequences of state 
penetration through political reform in the Qing dynasty, from the 1720s to the early Republican 
era. In this way, a frontier society based on ethnic politics was created by the Qing state, but the 
social consequences were mainly a result of long-term ethnic mobilization related to struggles 
with Qing officials and Dai chieftains. These changes led to the mutual dependence of diverse 
ethnic identities due to their different but colluding roles to become the Qing’s frontier society. 
Through this frontier construction, political powers—including the Lahu, Dai, Wa, and Han—
negotiated with one another, but they had also all interacted collusively with Qing state power 
for a long time on the Yunnan-Burma borderland. Through this mechanism, the Lahu people, as 
a cultural and political ethnicity, mobilized themselves and maintained their own system—the 
“Five Buddha Districts” (????)—on this frontier until the 1890s. This politicized religious 
movement significantly reconstructed Lahu culture and identity. 
This article discusses how the Five Buddha Districts was at first a militarization system 
under the leadership of Big Vehicle Teaching monks, as well as how an elite family developed 
its hereditary religious power as E Sha Buddha, a kind of Buddha king, among the Lahu 
communities for at least four generations. This leader claimed a godlike power among the Lahu, 
but also performed another role for many years as the native chieftain representing the Lahu in 
front of Qing officials (figure 1).1 The Qing officials’ strategy was to allow the E Sha Buddha to 
control the mountain communities if neither the Qing officials nor the Dai chieftain could 
effectively do so. The Qing officials regarded the culture of the Lahu people as very different 
from that of the Han Chinese, but although they practiced a different economic system and spoke 
a different language, the officials were willing to listen to the words of these monks. Thus, 
monks like those from the Zhang family established their own administrative systems, dividing 
the whole West Mekong mountain area into several administrative districts like a centralized 
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kingdom. These monks-cum-political leaders still maintained their subordinate roles as low-level 
“local chieftains” (tumu ??), however. They interacted with the Qing state for many years, 
until the Qing government finally destroyed the system in response to social changes taking 
place in Burma with the coming of British colonial power after 1885. 
 
?
 
Figure 1. The silver hat of E Sha Buddha. Source: Heritage collection of Lancang County, 
Yunnan. 
 
This article thus examines a particular political style that developed in the frontier context, 
a style that could be viewed as a political appendage to the Qing state from the 1790s to the 
1890s. In order to respond to a series of academic theories about this frontier, cases like this 
should be considered in the context of the wider literature concerning state extension on the 
frontier or social encounters between different political systems on the borderland between China 
and Southeast Asia (especially between Yunnan and Burma). 
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Two types of scholarship with very different perspectives on topics like ethnic 
relationships, state power, and markets in this region are currently being produced. One group 
comprises scholars who are trained in Sinology, studying Chinese history; the other is composed 
of scholars who are looking at China from their training as Southeast Asianists. In the latter 
group, James Scott (2009) has contributed to a reevaluation of the social and cultural 
characteristics of mountain groups such as the Lahu, Wa, Akha, and Hani and their relationships 
with the so-called lowland state in highland Southeast Asia and Southeast China. Scott points out 
that, as the reach of the Chinese state expanded, these mountain peoples were either absorbed 
into the Han or moved away, often after a failed revolt. As this process was repeated again and 
again, culturally complex zones of refuge sprang up in the region’s hinterlands. Scott developed 
the concept of “Zomia” to describe zones of refuge. Zomia was a non-state space based on 
certain ecological regularities and structural relationships that did not hesitate to cross national 
frontiers (Scott 2009, 23–26). 
Tatsuki Kataoka disagrees, however, with Scott’s claim that the Lahu are one of the 
typically stateless people of “Zomia” whose culture rejected the notion of a state. Instead, he 
argues that the Lahu became stateless and were conscious of the loss of their state after the 
process of modern state formation began. Kataoka claims that English-language scholars have 
misinterpreted this due to their inability to access the history of the Lahu (Kataoka 2013). In this 
article, I contend that the notion of a “stateless Lahu” did not exist in Yunnan either before Qing 
officials destroyed the Five Buddha Districts system or after. I provide detailed information 
about the rise and fall of the Lahu political system, showing how the state created the Five 
Buddha Districts and, further, how social agency attached this system to the state through 
negotiations with neighboring political-identity systems on the frontier between Yunnan and 
Burma. 
In contrast to Scott and other Southeast Asianists, scholars studying China offer different 
perspectives on the junction between China and Southeast Asia and, more specifically, between 
Yunnan and Burma (figure 2). For instance, C. Patterson Giersch points out that the Yunnan-
Burma frontier was regarded by American anthropologist William Skinner as one part of a 
“macroregion” market and urban system of China (Giersch 2011). Giersch observes that the 
circulation of goods (in particular, the circulation of copper and cotton) between Yunnan, South 
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China, Tonkin, and Burma—ignored by Skinner—was central to Yunnan’s economy during the 
seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. Circulation involves more than just mobility or trade; it 
implies long-term relations created by repeated flows that transform society (Giersch 2011). 
However, in his earlier work, Giersch also argues that the frontier between Yunnan and Burma is 
a “middle ground,” because it contains places of fluid cultural and economic exchange where 
acculturation and the creation of hybrid institutions are contingent on local conditions. In this 
land, newcomers and natives adapted in order to manipulate each other. Meanwhile, the Qing 
never demarcated clear political boundaries along this frontier (Giersch 2006, 3–4). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Southern Yunnan-Burma frontier in the later Qing dynasty. Source: drawn by the 
author. 
 
However, the ethnicity of the natives was closely linked with the Qing state’s policies. 
Additionally, the formation of the Yunnan-Burma frontier was a dynamic process, and clear 
boundaries were maintained between interior official counties and exterior Dai-Shan 
chieftaincies. The population included both the previous mountain peoples and the Han settlers 
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who worked in the mines or were driven away by Qing officials from east of the Mekong River 
to the mountains west of the same river in the 1790s. Together, the settlers established a political 
system based on their religious and administrative centers and whether or not the Qing 
government attacked them frequently or allowed them to work as local agency. But the mountain 
communities had maintained their own system for more than a century under the conditions that 
Giersch lays out, such as goods exchange and the increase and decline of the mining industry. 
However, Giersch does not mention the wars between the Qing and the Alaungpaya dynasty in 
Burma from 1764 to 1770, nor the decline in the mining industry in this region before the 1790s 
(Ma 2011). In this way, although the frontier was a zone in which multiple peoples met, it was 
also a zone of ethnic creation and the space of frontier agents. This zone was used in the 
Luohei’s struggles and negotiations with the state and other local political systems for the 
political and cultural construction of Lahu identity. 
 
Social Change and Ethnic Conflict in the Early Qing in Southern Yunnan 
After the Ming government set up its administrative system in Yunnan in the 1380s, there 
were numerous revolts in central and western Yunnan. Eventually, the Ming government came to 
control the transportation routes and cities in the main basins. However, the region beyond the 
Red River, called the River’s Exterior (jiang wai ??), was under the jurisdiction of native Dai 
(bai yi ??) chieftains. Because the Red River’s inhabitants belonged to the category of 
“barbarian households” (yi hu ??), they were not required to register in the official county 
records or to pay land taxes to the government, even though they did pay taxes and corvée to 
their native chieftains (Huang [1922] 1968; Ni [1846] 1992, [1719] 2001). The Ming 
government exerted strict control over the security of the main transportation routes, but it had a 
different strategy for controlling the mountain areas (Ma 2013e). 
Because of wars and the government’s revenue policy changes, especially the change 
from poll tax to hidage (a tax based on units of land owned) in the late Ming and the early Qing, 
more and more Han migrants moved to Yunnan, causing demographic change in the inner 
provinces. Historian James Lee did a series of studies on the issue of population change, which 
showed that the Chinese population increased threefold during the early and middle Qing 
dynasty, from 150 million in 1700 to 450 million in 1850 (Lee 1982, 711). During this period, 
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the estimated population in Yunnan and Guizhou increased fourfold, from five million to twenty 
million, suggesting that some of the newly increased population had shifted from the inner 
provinces to the southwest frontier. Among those migrants, miners accounted for 10 percent in 
the 1750s, but increased to 30 percent—or about half a million—in 1800. In Yunnan, immigrants 
made up about 20 percent of the total population, about 20 million inhabitants (Lee 1982, 711). 
This demographic change was also bound with the political change in Yunnan. Before the Qing 
government carried out political reforms to integrate the native chieftain system into official 
counties (Gaitu Guiliu?????) in the 1720s, large numbers of immigrants settled in southern 
Yunnan, especially south of the Ailao Mountains. The Qing officials realized that, with more and 
more Han immigrants settling in these mountain areas, social transformation from chieftain 
jurisdiction to the official county system would be accomplished. The political reform from 
chieftaincy to county was also facilitated by the implementation of a new system of taxation and 
farmland management. In order to make farmland freely available on the open market it had to 
be measured so that it could be easily bought and sold, and land tax was allocated to the new, 
individual owners (Ma 2013a). This reform attracted even more immigration from the interior 
counties of China. 
Until the 1850s, resettled immigrants comprised more than 60 percent of the local 
population (Fang 2003). In parallel to the process of immigration settlement in southern Yunnan, 
the Qing government also extended the official administrative system based on calculations of 
possible revenue income, which could come from the tea and salt trade (YT 1840). From the 
1720s to the 1750s, the Qing government in southern Yunnan reformed its salt policy in order to 
extract more income from the salt wells in the Weiyuan River area after the Puer Prefecture was 
established. In the 1750s, whole areas of Shunning Prefecture (figure 3), as well as the Dai 
chieftain areas west of the Mekong River, came under the same salt-consuming district (Dang 
[1904] 2001, 335). Meanwhile, the Yunnan-Guizhou governor, Ertai, established an official tea-
selling system. After 1748, the government converted the tea-trade building into an official store 
and created a tea-coupon system similar to that used in the salt trade. Businesspeople had to first 
apply for tea coupons from prefecture officials, then take these coupons to the mountainous areas 
east of the Mekong River in Puer Prefecture to buy tea from the official tea store, and finally 
move the tea by caravan to other parts of China (Kun [1886] 2003). 
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Figure 3. Map of Shunning Prefecture, 1818. Source: Bo ([1818] 2009, 70). 
 
Following the changes in salt and tea policy, which were enforced to control mountain 
resources, the Qing government carried out political reforms to abolish the chieftains. These 
reforms in turn seriously influenced the daily life of indigenous communities, such as the Luohei, 
Woni, Dai, and other communities along the Weiyuan River and in the mountainous tea 
plantation areas in the newly established Puer Prefecture. 
According to a local saying, there was a process of “the Han driving the Yi [the 
barbarians] away” (hanjin yitui ????) following the governmental policies of political 
transformation. However, this process also set the conditions for Lahu identity mobilization. The 
contemporary writing style of the Lahu was based on the writing of the Luohei (Ma 2013a, 5). 
Before being squeezed by the new settlers and the following social conflicts, the Luohei were 
still an insignificant group, according to local historical archives. The categories of indigenous 
people in the southern Yunnan mountain areas beyond the Ailao Mountains used to be defined 
by only two crude labels: the Cuan (?) and the Bo (?). For instance, “In Zhenyuan County, 
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local peoples are all of the Pu and the Luo. Their customs are based mainly on their loose ties 
with the officials. Because their lands are lean, the Luo barbarians rely on slash-and-burn 
farming” (Liu [1879] 2001, 341). Another archival document says, “The Kuchong is a branch of 
the Cuan and has been under the jurisdiction of Linan Prefecture since the Yuan dynasty (1271–
1368). Now they live in the Linan, Yuanjiang, Zhenyuan, and Puer Prefectures” (Liu [1879] 
2001, 106). In the conflicts over local resources, more and more groups became involved with 
the Luohei and assimilated with them in a political movement or identity mobilization, starting 
with the first resistance movements in the 1720s. A new Luohei (the Lahu, as they call 
themselves) gradually absorbed many Han immigrants, and some of these immigrants became 
leaders of the Luohei and fought other Han or Qing officials. 
Indigenous people mobilized around resistance, and, because the Luohei used to live in 
the mountain areas where many salt wells were scattered, they became the core and the largest of 
the rebel groups. The Lahu became visible in the movement, mainly through the political and 
religious system of the Five Buddha Districts (GZD, Bo Lin). Thus, we could say that “Lahu” 
was a newly shaped ethnicity that different parties joined. Meanwhile, the Lahu culture, 
subidentities, and social structures have also been reshaped, in the history of frontier formation, 
with their resettlement. The Lahu name was pronounced as la54 xε31 but written in Chinese 
characters as ?? (Luohei).2 In a local context, the pronunciation of “Lahu” and “Luohei” are 
similar, but when written as “Luohei” (??), the meaning became negative and discriminatory. 
In brief, in the context of social change since the 1720s, more and more indigenous 
groups, especially the Luohei moved toward the southern and western parts of the Mekong River 
from the Ailao Mountains and Mianning basins. Even though some of them still remained in the 
Weiyuan and Simao mountain areas, the majority of these resettled peoples were led by Han 
Chinese monks in the reorganization of their social order into something new. The place they 
inhabited was called the Luohei Mountains in the official archives (Cen [1897] 1989, 903). After 
the Five Buddha Districts system was established in the Luohei Mountains, this region also 
became known as the Upper Convert (???) and the Lower Convert????), named by the 
monks, and covered both banks of the Small Black River (Xiao Hei Jiang ???), which is a 
tributary of the Mekong River in the west. 
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The Five Buddha Districts System in the Luohei Mountains since the 1790s 
 
Monk Yang Deyuan and His Followers 
According to a document written in 1805, a monk named Yang Deyuan (???), from 
Jizu Mountain (???), a famous Buddhist holy mountain in Dali, founded the Five Buddha 
Districts in the mountains west of the Mekong River. Monk Yang’s family migrated from 
Youyang County (??) in Chongqing Prefecture in eastern Sichuan Province, which was one of 
several strongholds of the White Lotus (Bailiang Jiao ???) religious movement in the 1770s 
and 1780s. Jizu Mountain was originally the base of the Big Vehicle Religion, which was created 
by a local scholar, Zhang Baotai (???), but in 1746 the Big Vehicle Religion was banned by 
the Qianlong Emperor, who deemed it anti-government. It then became a branch sect of the 
White Lotus movement and developed into branches of various Chinese secret societies. 
However, this sect has not been considered an orthodox Buddhist sect, because it combined 
Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian ideas for the purpose of its own political movement (Zhang 
[1751] 2001). Monk Yang Deyuan grew up on Jizu Mountain during the early period of the 
Qinglong reign and became a Buddhist monk there. Later he traveled in upper Burma as a 
wandering monk and temporarily settled in the Mubang (Lashio area, ??) region. After the 
wars between the Qing and Burma (Dai 2004), Yang Deyuan moved to the mountains along the 
Mekong River and set up bases at Mannuo (??) on the west bank and at Da Shifang (???) 
in Jinggu (along the Weiyuan River) on the east bank. After he came to the Luohei Mountains 
(figure 4), more and more Luohei, Wa, and Han people converted to his religion. As he was 
regarded as a Buddha, Monk Yang Deyuan also became known as the Monk Convert (Gaixin 
Heshan ????) (GZD, Shu Lin 1801a). In 1790, he set up his first base at Mannuo Village, 
dug a pool there, and then built a temple in nearby Nanzha Village (??). At these two places, 
he trained about 360 student monks over a period of more than ten years, several of whom went 
on to become famous in their own right: Monk Tong Deng (??), Monk Tong Wei (??), 
Monk Tong Bei (??), and Monk Tong Jin (??). After Yang Deyuan died, his most active 
follower, Monk Tong Jin, succeeded in his position. Monk Tong Jin built a close relationship 
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with Yangjing (??or??) on the eastern side of the Mekong River in the Weiyuan and Simao 
Mountains. The two men were the leaders of the future Luohei resistance (YST 1805). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Luohei Mountains in the middle of Lancang County, close to the Munai mines. 
Source: Photo taken by the author, 2012. 
 
According to some local archives, Monk Yang Deyuan and his followers divided the 
Luohei Mountains into areas known as Upper Convert and Lower Convert, where they gradually 
developed the system of the Five Buddha Districts. Yang’s third student, Tong Bei, moved to 
Weiyuan County to cooperate with native Luohei leader Yangjing to mobilize the Luohei along 
the Weiyuan River to occupy the Niujian Mountain (???) in Jinggu. Tong Bei and Yangjing 
also worked with leaders such as Zhana (??), Zhadu???), and Zhake (??) to fight the 
Qing army in the area of the Weiyuan River where the salt wells were scattered (GZD Le Bao 
1797). This political resistance had been deeply influenced by the presence of Yang Deyuan’s 
religious sect on either side of the Mekong River. The rebels first started their campaign against 
the government’s salt policy in 1793 on the east side of the Mekong River, but by 1803, the Qing 
army had driven most of them away to the west side of the river. During those ten years, more 
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and more Luohei and other natives, as well as many Han immigrants, resettled in the Luohei 
Mountains (???) (Ma 2013a). 
The Yunnan-Guizhou governors, Bo Lin and Yongbao, set the Mekong River as the 
border between the Luohei “bandits” and the inner counties by taking the Luohei people and the 
Luohei Mountains as the barrier between the inner counties and Burma: 
It is difficult to cultivate the mind of Luohei bandits. The Shunning Prefecture is 
contiguous with Mubang (the Lashio area), separating the Burmese by the Luohei 
bandits, as well as by the Kachin, who serve as the barriers between the 
Yongchang Prefecture and the Burmese in Manmo (the Bhamo area), so the 
Burmese could not easily cross the Luohei and the Wilders to connect with the 
inner lands. (Bo [1818] 1901, 28) 
 
The Qing government tried to manage the Luohei “bandits” into a human fence by driving them 
to the mountains west of the Mekong River, and they demarcated the Luohei Mountains with the 
inner land of Weiyuan and Simao Counties by the Mekong River in the 1790s, after resistance 
rose against the salt policies. 
As more indigenous groups became involved in political resistance against the Qing 
government’s taxation reform policies from the 1720s to the 1790s, the alliance came to include 
Luohei settlers and miners from Jianxi and Hunan, as well as from some interior counties such as 
Dali, Chuxiong, and Shiping. This was also the time of the wars between Qing China and the 
Burmese Kingdom. The monks who followed the teachings of the Big Vehicle Religion also 
became active in the terrain between the chieftains of Mengmeng, Menglian, and Gengma, and 
their religious teachings quickly spread throughout the mountain communities. In brief, the Quan 
(?) system in the mountains, which had been under the chieftains’ management and was based 
on the village heads’ leadership, developed into a new style under the hierarchy of temples and 
monks among the villages.3 Meanwhile, as a result of the new Lahu political system, the earlier 
mountain inhabitants, who were mainly from the Bulang and Wa communities, were clustered 
into the western Wa lands. The settlers refused to pay the Mountain and River Tax (???), 
which was based on a fixed ratio of Quans, to the Mengmeng and Menglian chieftains, causing 
waves of conflict. The chieftains frequently burned down newly built temples, but in 1790, the 
Dai official in Shangyun, under the Menglian chieftain, began to accept bribes sent by Monk 
Yang Deyuan and allowed the monk to build his first temple in Nanzha. However, the 
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Mengmeng chieftain continued to harry Monk Yang and his followers for many years, until the 
monks led their warriors against the chieftain and drove him out to Mianning. The conflicts were 
reported to the provincial governors, and then to the Qing court (YST 344–19–1960; Yang [1908] 
1995, 359–361; GZD Yong Bao 1804: 4–1754–5; GZD Shu Lin 1801: 004958). Monk Tong Jin, 
who assumed the leadership of the Upper and the Lower Converts after Monk Yang died, 
eventually surrendered to the Qing government when the official army occupied the Baka 
fortresses on the west bank of the Mekong River in 1799. The Yunnan-Guizhou governor, Yong 
Bao, conducted a detailed investigation and reported the following to the Emperor Jiaqing: 
 
Monk Tong Jin was a Han Chinese migrant. The Luohei refused to pay taxation to 
the Dai chieftains at Mengliang and Mengmeng, but they were prepared to pay 
this tax to Monk Tong Jin. Monk Tong Jin would like to help the government 
control the Luohei, and there are more than 20,000 villagers under his control 
now living in this area. Because he is trusted by the Luohei villagers and is 
powerful enough to negotiate with the Dai chieftains at Mengmeng and 
Mengliang, and because the Luohei people trust in his fairness, it still might be 
effective to issue an official title to him, which would allow him to control the 
Luohei for the government. He should reassume his old name, Zhang Fuguo (?
??), be issued the official title of low-level native chieftain (??), and be sent 
back to Nanxing (??) to be the Luohei official. (Zhou [1945] 2007, 13) 
 
However, Monk Tong Jin led the Luohei attack against the nearby Dai chieftains and refused to 
follow the government order. This military action caused some Dai chieftains to complain 
vehemently to the emperor. The most serious complaint was sent by the Cheli chieftain 
(Sipsongpanna) who complained about the Luohei, who had gradually occupied some territories 
in northern Cheli. In 1812, Emperor Jiaqing sent an army to attack Upper Convert and arrested 
Monk Tong Jin, who was killed at Mianning in the same year at the age of forty-four (1768–
1812) (GZD Zhang Fuguo 1813). After Monk Tong Jin died, his sons and grandsons continued to 
control the Upper and Lower Convert Mountains, based at their centers in the Nanzha and 
Mannuo temples. 
The Five Buddha Districts system was based on the centralized religious and political 
power held by generations of this Zhang family since Monk Tong Jin, also known as Zhang 
Fuguo. According to some official documents and local archives, the Luohei people regarded 
these monks as gods. After more Luohei and other groups, such as the Lisuo (??) and Laomian 
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(??), and some Han immigrants moved into Upper and Lower Converts, they reorganized into 
many mixed communities, and the former inhabitants, the Wa villagers, drifted away to the more 
western mountains (Ma 2013c). After the central temple at Nanzha was built, it became the 
political and religious center of Upper and Lower Convert. After the era of Monk Tong Jin, the 
Upper and Lower Converts were divided into several Buddha districts. The Lahu people called 
this system the “Five Buddhas and Five Scriptures” (ηa53 fu31 ηa53 ki33?????). This became 
the official term for the districts in the Upper and Lower Converts mountain areas and is still 
used today (Zhou [1945] 2007, 730). From the 1790s to the 1880s, this region, from Mianning in 
the north to Cheli in the south, gradually divided into four, five, and then six Buddha Districts. 
By the 1810s, its population had already risen to 3,000 household inhabitants (GZD Bo Lin 
1813). 
 
The Development of the Five Buddha Districts Based on Nanzha-Mannuo 
 The central temple at Nanzha was not only a political center but also a base for training 
young monks. Monk Tong Jin and his successors claimed that they were the reincarnation of 
creation god E Sha himself. According to myth in the Upper and Lower Converts region, E Sha 
was the creator of the world and a human being. But in Chinese documents, Monk Tong Jin and 
his sons and grandsons were known as the Luohei Taiye (????), a king-like chief. This 
master and great savior could be reincarnated generation by generation, sometimes disappearing, 
but then returning to save people from suffering. It is believed that all knowledge and skills 
known to people must come from E Sha. Based on this idea, Zhang Fuguo and his followers also 
set up the Nanzha temple as a school for religious education and leadership training (YST 1959a). 
The development process of this Five Buddha Districts system, after the first temple was 
built in Nanzha, was gradual. Nanzha and Mannuo were close to the ferry point crossings of the 
Mekong River, enabling the monks to easily control the transportation routes from Mengban to 
Mengmeng and Mengyun (Shang Yun ??), which linked the Wa mountains to Burma and the 
inner counties of China (Ma 2013c). These used to be the most important routes for goods being 
transported between various regional business centers, such as silver from the mines at Maolong 
and Munai, cotton imported from nearby valleys and from Burma, tea from the Dashan Tea 
plantations (???), and salt that was produced at the Weiyuan salt wells and sold to the 
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mountains’ inhabitants. Since the 1790s, this territory has been divided into four, five, then six 
districts: Mannuo was the subcenter for Upper Convert and later became Shuangjiang County, 
while the Lower Convert included the central Nanzha Buddha District (???), the Mengnuo 
Buddha District (???), the Wang Foye Buddha District (????), the Kalang Buddha 
District (???), the Dongzhu Buddha District (???), and the Manda Buddha District (??
?), although their names and territories could have changed over time. The leadership of the 
Dongzhu Buddha District was shifted to the Ximeng Mountain area by the last monk leader, San 
Fuzu (???), who used be a student of the Zhangs in Nanzhaand. The Ximeng Mountains area 
became the Meng Ka Buddha District (???) in the 1880s (“Lancangxian dandanguan,” Fu 
1943). 
Traditionally, a central temple was built in each Buddha district, and the leaders were 
secularized monks who had been sent there after graduating from Nanzha temple. These leaders 
were called the jo54 mo54, or the khu35 in Lahu language, a term indicating that their authority 
was given by E Sha Buddha. There was also a position at the Nanzha temple called the La. The 
La was in charge of the central temple’s public affairs. The best monk graduates were appointed 
to be Big Foye masters and took on the responsibilities of religious affairs, including organizing 
rituals and holding regular religious sermons for ordinary people. The monks who were most 
trusted by the great E Sha Buddha (the fu31 zu53 pha53) would become the jo54 mo54 and, 
eventually, governors of the Buddha districts (YST 1959b). 
Regarding the levels of Buddha Districts, consider, for instance, the Muga Valley, where 
there used to be an important area known as the Mengnuo Buddha District in the southern part of 
the Nanzha center.4 The district central temple was set up at Mengnuo Village, and there were 
sixteen villages in the Muga Valley, which formed the district. In each village, a village temple 
called fu31 ye31, meaning the house for worshipping E Sha Buddha, was built (figure 5). A monk 
(pha31) or manager (fu31 gua33 pa31) was put into position to look after the temple. Normally, 
these monks were trained at the district’s central temple at Mengnuo, a second-level political and 
educational center for the district. In Muga Valley, all family heads in each village met every 
year at their village temples during the New Year festival to select their village heads (the kha54 
ʃie33) under the name of E Sha Buddha. The village heads had to organize village warriors (the 
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ma31 pa31) into a band and collect grain as taxation from the households. All sixteen villages 
contributed taxes to the central district temple at Mengnuo Village, and the villagers gathered at 
the village temple and at the central district temple to celebrate the New Year Festival and the 
Mid-Autumn Festival. As the district leader, the khu35 went to the Nanzha temple regularly to 
attend meetings about military activities, seasonal agricultural arrangements, religious rituals, 
and so on. Like Wang Fuye (???) in the Dashan area and San Fuzu in the Dongzhu area, one 
of the famous khu35 in the Muga Valley was Lord Xi (???). Lord Xi was an orphan in Fugo 
Village in Muga, but he was sent to Nanzha to be trained as a monk. Based on his excellent 
achievements at Nanzha, he was promoted and then appointed to be the khu35 of the Mengnuo 
Buddha District. Thus, he returned to Muga as the leader. Lord Xi led the Muga army in joint 
military actions against the Han in Mianniang basin and against the Wa tribes in Upper and 
Lower Kunma (today’s Kunma tribes in Burma), but he was killed by Qing officials in the 1880s. 
Another famous khu35 in Mengnuo Buddha District was Lord Zhabu (????), who led the 
Muga army to cooperate with San Fuzu in the wars of occupation in the Ximeng Mountains and 
then established the Mengka Buddha District among the Wa tribes (YST 1959b; Zhang and Peng 
[1959] 1981). 
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Figure 5. A village temple in Muga Valley, 1995. Source: Photo taken by the author. 
 
Based on some official historical archives found in Shuangjiang County, in the former 
Upper Convert area, the leadership of Monk Tong Jin, or Zhang Fuguo, was inherited by his son, 
Zhang Bingquan (???), and then by Zhang Bingquan’s son, Zhang Dengfa (???). Later, 
Zhang Dengfa’s sons, Zhang Chaowen (???) and Zhang Shibao (???), inherited the 
leadership (Cen [1897] 1989, 901). It seems that the centralized leadership of the Nanzha temple 
and its branch at Mannuo Village in Upper Convert was under the control of the Zhang family 
for at least four generations, from Monk Tong Jin, through his male descendants, to Zhang 
Chaowen, who escaped to Burma in the early 1900s. Under the Five Buddha Districts system, all 
villagers had to provide their corvée and pay taxes. The Upper Convert village heads, or kha54 
 ie33, organized strong male villagers into warrior bands of three men each: one to carry the 
crossbow, one to carry the spear, and the last to hold the coutel, a short knife or dagger. These 
village warriors were known as the ma31 pa31 or ma31 ya53, and their commanders were called the 
ma31 pa31 lu35—meaning the heads of the warriors (bing tou ??). Weapons included arrows 
and firearms made in some Lahu villages, which could shoot to a distance of over 200 meters 
(Bian Weihui 1995, 41). The many well-known folk stories at my field site in Muga Valley about 
a wise man who used to be a warrior suggest that the village-based, militarized power deeply 
shaped the everyday lives of people under the Five Buddha Districts system. 
During the period between 1856 and 1872, the rebel Panthay Muslim leader, Du Wenxiu 
(???), sent official seals to Zhang Bingquan at Upper Convert, which means that the Five 
Buddha Districts were under the leadership of, or in cooperation with, the Panthay government at 
Dali until 1872 (YST 1959b; Atwill 2005). Later, the Qing army arrested Zhang Dengfa and one 
of his sons, Zhang Shibao. However, neither man could speak the Han Chinese language, which 
was used during their trials; they could speak only the Lahu language, according to the official 
archives (Qiu 1948). This Zhang family’s relationship also showed that the Five Buddha 
Districts system was not was isolated from state governance and local politics. 
 
The Five Buddha Districts as a Political Entity Attached to the State 
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 For years, Han immigrants worked in the Xiyi and Munai silver mines, but when the 
mines were depleted around the turn of the nineteenth century, these miners came to work with 
the neighboring Luohei and Wa communities. Some of them developed close relationships with 
the monks who had set up religious centers at Nanzha and Mannuo and the miners had become 
deeply involved in the local resistance movements against the Qing government. However, many 
Han immigrants still wanted to encroach on the land of indigenous people from other interior 
basins like Mianning, or even from Jiangxi and Hunan Provinces (GZD Bo Lin 1813). The two 
categories of Han settlers also followed different patterns of localization: they either became 
local Han or became part of the Luohei system in the mountains. Monk Yang Deyuan and Monk 
Tong Jin were both people of Han descent, but they were leaders of the Five Buddha Districts 
system. Monk Tong Jin married, and his sons and grandsons became Lahu. Through each 
passing generation, the Zhang family stabilized its Buddha-king leadership and was recognized 
for generations as the reborn E Sha Buddha by the Lahu people. This historical memory is 
recalled in Lahu healing rituals even today, during the New Year Festival in Lancang and 
Shuangjaing Counties. The reshaped Lahu cultural and social system among different subgroups 
takes this understanding as core to Lahu identity in Yunnan, Burma, and Thailand (Ma 2013a, 
167). 
Because of the religious movement, increasing numbers of Han immigrants became Lahu. 
Some groups, like the Lisuo, Laomian, and Han, joined with the Lahu to become the Lahu of 
today. Some of their surnames, such as Bai, Tie, Shi, Ji, and Kong, could also be found among 
Lahu people. Even if surnames are not very significant in Lahu, since they can be taken from the 
father’s or mother’s side (Du 2002), they are still important historical reminders that show the 
complex origins of the Lahu people. According to local documents, the original Han immigrants 
who had converted to Lahu were known as the “Small Yellow Luohei” (????) (Zhou [1945] 
2007, 730).5 
Based on official archives and recently discovered records, the secret sect of Da Cheng 
Jiao was created by Zhang Baotai at Jizu Mountain in 1689 and quickly spread throughout many 
provinces. This sect combined Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian inscriptions to worship Buddhist 
and Taoist deities. It was eventually banned in the 1740s after Zhang Baotai died (Zhang [1751] 
2001, 694).  Other Han Chinese monks spread their religious beliefs among the mountain 
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peoples and mobilized people into a political movement against the Qing government. Through 
this movement, Lahu identity was reconfirmed and the boundary of Lahu ethnicity was enlarged 
to include more groups. At the same time, Lahu culture underwent reconstruction under the 
political system of the Five Buddha Districts. Through the Five Buddha District movement and 
their resistance against the Qing government, the indigenous societies in the mountainous areas 
to the west of the Mekong River had become well organized into a three-layered political system 
with a religious and political center. This system existed for more than a hundred years, from the 
1790s to the early 1900s, despite the center being destroyed in 1888 by the Qing army. Even 
today, many Lahu people in Yunnan, Burma, and Thailand still practice this localized religious 
tradition, which originally came from Jizu Mountain. However, there is no significant reason to 
suggest that this system has any relationship with “shifting agriculture as ‘escape agriculture’” 
(Scott 2009, 191). Some Lahu practiced slash-and-burn agriculture in certain areas over various 
time periods, but most of them also practiced wet-rice farming on the mountainsides. Other Lahu 
were businessmen. They had all escaped from somewhere, but they had established a centralized 
political hierarchy since the 1790s. 
Thus, the development of the Five Buddha Districts system was based mainly on the 
Quan model, through which the Mengmeng, Menglian, and nearby chieftains could control the 
mountain communities. In this grassroots political system, village heads were responsible for 
collecting taxes for the chieftains. But the monks promoted a different political model, based on 
their political ideals, through this Five Buddha system. In this way, not only was the centralized 
leadership of villages and districts, but also the cultural mechanism of a “Buddha-kind system,” 
was established. This system gradually came to be accepted among the Luohei and some of the 
Wa communities. In the wars against the Qing and the Dai chieftains, the militarization in these 
communities achieved its peak when warriors were organized to fight against the official army 
based in fortresses along the Mekong River, but their families were organized into different 
camps in the forest along the mountainside. The militarization also stimulated the later cultural 
integration of the Lahu (Ma 2011, 2012; GZD Shu Lin 1801). As a social and cultural 
consequence, the Lahu reorganized based partly on village terraced rice field agriculture and 
communal hierarchy, but more on the bilateral, nonlineal kinship system. This system constituted 
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a dynamic social institution that allowed all couples to be equal to other couples, but village 
authority over the equality of social units came from religious power (Ma 2013c, 2013d). 
 
 
The Fall of the Five Buddha Districts System 
Around 1882, Zhang Bingquan and his followers occupied the city of Mengmeng and 
drove away the Dai chieftain, Han Chaoding, to Mianning. Then they attacked the northern Han 
settlements in Mianning territory. In 1886, after the three Anglo-Burmese wars, the British army 
occupied the Burmese capital, Mandalay, and colonized Burma. This concerned the Yunnan-
Guizhou governor, Cen Yuying (???), who tried to organize border negotiations with British 
colonial authorities (figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Chinese official with bodyguard during the boundary commission, 1899. Source: Photo 
taken by James George Scott, British Library, photo 92/1(67). 
 
Facing the coming of British imperialism, Xue Fucheng, the Chinese minister to Britain, 
contributed his thoughts about the border issue to the Qing court: 
 
International affairs should be considered as a positive negotiation. It is not 
correct if we think that some small pieces of land are not significant enough to 
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enlarge or reduce the area of China. During the Qianglong reign (1711–1799), the 
Burmese occupied some chieftain territories relying on its stronger power, 
whereas the areas outside the Eight Gates [Ba Guan ??, claimed in the Ming 
dynasty] have been largely lost already. The border on the southwestern frontier is 
ambiguous. If we do not try to extend the border forward, the lands will be 
occupied by [the British]. (Xue 1971, 4) 
According to Xue’s strategy, if the Qing government had to draw a clear border with Burma, the 
first step was to extend the Qing government’s territory. The Five Buddha Districts system had 
to be destroyed first to allow a county to be built in this area. These steps were necessary 
preparation for the later border negotiations with British powers in Burma. 
In 1887, Cen Yuying sent the Qing army to the border between the Five Buddha Districts 
and Mianning County along the eastern Mekong River. In accordance with suggestions from 
local gentries in Mianning, on Governor Cen’s order, Mianning nobleman Qiu Denfeng (???) 
commanded nine powerful families under the leadership of the Five Buddha Districts system—
including the Shi family, who controlled the ferry crossing on the Mekong River in the Wang 
Fuye Buddha District, the Li family in the southern Lower Convert, and the Xiao family in the 
middle—to surrender to the government. The Qing government entitled nine new Tusi 
(inheritable native chieftains) to these families under the Five Buddha Districts system, but the 
Zhang Bingquan family rejected the call to surrender. In the following year, 1888, the Qing army 
crossed the Mekong River from Jinggu and Simao in the east, as well as from Mianning in the 
north. After that, according to Fang Guoyu: 
 
In ten years of destruction, all Buddha temples and monks perished, [and] the 
centers of the Luohei rebellious movement were temples and the Fuye [Buddhist 
lords ??] were the leaders. Since Monk Tong Jin rose up in 1800, until the 
destruction of the Five Buddhas, the leaders were all monks. Therefore the 
general, Weichi Dongxiao [????], burned all the temples and killed all the 
monks. (Fang [1942] 2008, 115) 
 
The endless wars that followed drove more and more Lahu people away from the Upper and 
Lower Converts toward northern Burma. 
In 1888, after the Qing army crossed the Mekong River, the Zhenbian military county (?
??????) was established in the former Five Buddha Districts territory. Later, in 1895, the 
first border treaty between the Qing government and British Burma was signed. The Lahu had 
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long been regarded as a human barrier separating the Burmese from the inner counties. But after 
Burma fell to British colonial power, the Qing government had to adjust its policy of frontier 
formation and quickly set up a military county in place of the Five Buddha system in the 
previously Lahu-occupied region. 
In summary, the Five Buddha Districts system was established by immigrant elites 
among the mountain peoples, but it was still a kind of appendage to the Qing state. The Qing 
state appointed and recognized Monk Tong Jin as a native official, but the Han gentry and Dai 
chieftains sometimes regarded him as a rebel bandit leader. Although it needed money to face the 
coming Western colonial power, the Qing government considered this recognition and its timing 
as a necessary strategy in order to control these territories. The Qing state therefore sent troops to 
destroy the Five Buddha system and build a new county, causing social suffering for the Lahu 
people through war and destruction. In this way, both the Zhang family and the Han heterodox 
monks worked as important state agents in shaping a polity outside but also attached to the state. 
The mobilization of Lahu identity and a political framework in the Luohei Mountains occurred 
outside the reach of official judicial power but was a political space adhered to the Qing empire. 
These monks used human agency to create a miniature state judicial system outside of the state, 
but they also worked to adhere the region to imperial state power. In other words, the Lahu and 
peoples like them have never been “freedom” or “anarchist” peoples who were separated from 
the state or who could keep the state at a distance, as suggested by James Scott (2009), even if 
the styles of the states were different. Why can we not just define the Five Buddha Districts 
system as a state-like polity attached to the state? 
 
Conclusion 
Some classical studies on political systems in the frontier mountains between China and 
Burma show that the Kachin’s social model, which is based on the oscillation between 
egalitarian (gumlao) and hierarchical (gumsa) political forms, is a result of differing forms of 
compromise between two conflicting ethnic systems (Leach 1986, 292; Friedman 1998, 44). But 
the Five Buddha Districts system provides another perspective from which to review the 
relationship between the state and frontier society. First, it suggests that we cannot simply 
consider the Southeast Asian highlands as a very diverse region and review the details of how the 
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Chinese empire shaped the rise and fall of ethnicity and political systems. Second, it suggests 
that the highlands cannot simply be regarded as a stateless region or zone. As Francois Robinne 
and Mandy Sadan point out, the transethnic dynamic challenges the notion of “multi-ethnicity,” 
and ethnicity could be regarded as a cultural marker in this great crossroads (Robinne and Sadan 
2007, 307). For peoples like the Lahu, this region is also a zone of ethnic creation. Many 
different groups have been mobilized and converted to become Lahu since the political reforms 
of the 1720s, when the Qing state expanded toward the southern Yunnan mountain areas to 
extend its revenue base to cover mountain resources such as silver and copper mines, salt wells, 
and tea plantations, as well as farmland on the frontier between Yunnan and Burma. The Lahu 
identity could be considered a historical mutual construction influenced by state power, as well 
as by the neighboring powers of the Dai chieftains, Wa tribes, and Han gentry powers, in the 
formation of the Yunnan-Burma frontier. This social reconstruction was based on a long-term 
mutual political mobilization, and it was deeply linked with the tradition of Chinese secret 
societies. The religious movement spread among the miners when the mining industry flourished 
from the 1730s to the 1790s. Its political influence also successfully spread over almost all of 
southern Yunnan and northern Burma before the outbreak of war between the Qing state and the 
Burmese Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885). Therefore, ethnicities like the Lahu did not simply 
preexist or come from being isolated, as in the case of the Kachin, nor were they simply based on 
a certain agricultural system in the mountains deemed as slash-and-burn or escape agriculture 
(Scott 2009, 187). 
After reviewing the history of the political system of Lahu in the formation of the 
Yunnan-Burma frontier, we have a better understanding of the relationship between identity 
mobilization and different governances in Southwest China and northern Burma through 
exploring state attachment. Some important facts should be reviewed carefully, including the 
demographic changes in China since the sixteenth century. The large empire was managed on 
various fundamental mechanisms such as ideologically based bureaucracy, military power, a 
huge revenue system, and so on. Many cases show that another form of frontier management had 
also been practiced by state agencies, in the form of state governance, in Yunnan, since the Ming 
dynasty, both in the valleys and mountains. This understanding therefore can enrich our 
knowledge about the historical process of cultural reconstruction and identity mobilization as a 
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mutual construction with frontier formation. Frontier formation links with state power on one 
hand and native human agency for the state on the other. 
It is hard to say whether the Lahu liked to keep the state at a distance through their 
“escaping culture,” or by slash-and-burn agriculture, even when they were in Yunnan, or in 
Burma under different state powers after the 1880s. If the term “Zomia people,” used by James 
Scott, suggests mountain people who could use their culture to keep the state at a distance, and if 
it is based on the condition that they had already acquired stable identities or cultural subjectivity 
before making their choice to escape in their everyday lives, the history of the Lahu and the 
formation of southern Yunnan do not match these criteria. As we learned above, the Lahu 
identity resulted from certain social consequences of frontier construction under different state 
powers. It was a mutual process between political groups and, regardless of whether they have 
many cultural differences or similarities or not, it is still possible to trace back the history of 
“where they come from,” and also to review the possibility of the correspondence between 
identities and political practices in the last several centuries. Monk Tong Jin and his Zhang 
family had been early frontier agents for the Qing state and acted as human agents in the 
reconstruction of everyday life among the mountain people, even though they were regarded as 
the reincarnated E Sha Buddha by the Lahu villagers. On the other hand, they were also regarded 
as native chieftains for the Qing officials, or they were appointed officials of the rebellious 
Panthay power, or were regard by the Mianning Han gentries as Lahu kings. This doesn’t mean 
that there was no relationship between their political practice and Lahu historical memory, and it 
is clear that the Five Buddha Districts system, as a three-layered centralized or state-like polity, 
existed in history. 
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Notes 
1 “Lahu” (??) was written as “Luohei” (??) in Chinese before 1953. In the native 
Yunnan Han dialect, “Lahu” has been pronounced as “Lao He,” which is equal to “Luo 
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Hei” (??). The Lahu called themselves la53 xo31; in the local Han dialect, the 
pronunciation of Luohei is la53 xɛ31.  
3 The superscript numbers indicate the tones of the Lahu language. 
2 In the areas controlled by Dai chieftains in southern Yunnan, such as in Sipsongpanna, 
Menglian, Gengma, and Shuangjiang, there were two different taxation units for basins 
and mountains. The quan (?) was a taxation unit in mountains. The head of a quan was 
responsible for collecting taxes from several mountain villages of this unit for the local 
Dai chieftain, based on a fixed ratio. However, unlike in a basin, the chieftains could not 
control these mountain communities directly. A taxation unit in the basins was known as 
a meng (勐).   
4 The Muga Valley has also been the author’s anthropological fieldwork site since 1995.  
5 From the author’s field notes on the Lahu in Fazhanhe xian, April 10, 2010.  
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